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Abstract
The main objective of this work is to develop a logic called IAL (Intentional Agency Logic) in which we can reason about
mental states of agents, action occurrences, and agentive and group powers. IAL will be exploited for a formal analysis of
different forms of power such as an agent i’s power of achieving a certain result and an agent i’s power over another agent
j (alias social power).
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1 Introduction
Power is one fundamental concept in a situation of agent interaction as studied in social theory and
multi-agent systems. Our aim is to design a general logical framework in which various and important
forms of power can be specified and their intrinsic and relational properties can be investigated.
A comprehensive formal model of power should clarify many subtle aspects of this individual and
social phenomenon. First of all it should characterize the most basic form of agentive power called
power of achieving something. When looking at an agent’s power of achieving a certain result,
we discover that this is based on the interrelation between objective level and subjective level. In
fact, i’s power of achieving a certain result ϕ seems to involve not only i’s objective opportunity
of achieving ϕ, but also i’s awareness over such an opportunity.1 For example, for a thief to have
the power of opening a safe, he must know its combination.
Moreover, a comprehensive formal model of power should be able to characterize social forms
of power which are commonly called social powers (or powers over). There are several types of
social powers which need to be distinguished and which have interesting relationships among them:
influencing power, persuasive power, dependence-based social power.
Influencing power is an agent’s power to influence other agents to do or to refrain from doing
certain actions.2 In other words, an agent i’s power of influencing another agent j consists in i’s
capacity to shape j’s preferences in such a way that j will intend or will not intend to do a certain
1In this article, the terms belief and awareness are taken to be synonymous, even though in the logic literature they often
have different meanings (see e.g. [22]).
2In this article, actions should be understood as action types, for that they are actions that can occur more than once.
action. For example, for a politician to have the power of influencing the electorate with regard to
the action of voting for him, he must have the power of inducing the electorate to vote for him.
Persuasive power is an agent’s power to induce other agents to believe or to abstain from believing
certain things. The relationship between influencing power and persuasive power is very tight.
Indeed, certain beliefs provide sufficient reasons for intending to do a certain action a: if agent i has
the power to induce these beliefs in agent j then, indirectly, i has the power to influence j to do the
action a.3 For example, again suppose i is a politician before an election and j is a potential voter.
Agent j wants to pay less taxes in the next year. If i has the power to persuade j that voting for him
and ensuring that he will win the election is the only way to pay less taxes in the next year then,
indirectly, i has the power to influence j’s decision in such a way that j will intend to vote for i.
Dependence-based social power of an agent i over another agent j is i’s power over j which is
based on j’s dependence on i for the achievement of his goals. In particular, i has a dependence-
based power over j if and only if, j has a certain goal and j will not achieve his goal without i’s
intervention. Dependence-based social power is tightly relatedwith influencing power and persuasive
power. In fact, under certain conditions, dependence-based social power and persuasive power enable
influencing power. For instance, if i has a dependence-based power over j and he is in a position to
make credible threats to j (persuasive power), then i has the power to affect j’s behaviour thereby
having a power of influencing j. Byway of example, consider the situation involving two hypothetical
countries called A and B in a conflict situation. In the initial situation, A has two actions it may take:
either puts an embargo on against B or it does nothing. B can respond in two different ways to A’s
action: either by moving a military attack against A (thereby starting a war against A) or by doing
nothing. Thus, after A’s initial move B has a dependence-based power over A. In fact, after A’s
initial move, A wants to avoid a war against B and the possibility of avoiding the war depends on
what B decides to do. Now, suppose B has the power of persuading A that if A makes an embargo
against B then B will move a military attack against A. Hence, because of its dependence-based
power and persuasive power over A, B has the power of inducing A to refrain from putting an
embargo on it, thereby having an influencing power over A.
To sum it up, a comprehensive formal model and ontology of power should allow:
• to reason about knowledge of agents in order to study the discretionary aspect of their powers
of ;
• to clarify the nature of different kinds of social power and in particular:
◦ an agent i’s power of influencing another agent j as i’s capacity to affect j’s intentions in
such a way that j will do or will refrain from doing a certain action;
◦ an agent i’s power of persuading another agent j as i’s capacity to induce j to believe or to
abstain from believing certain things;
◦ an agent i’s dependence-based power over another agent j as j’s dependence on a certain
action of i for the achievement of his goals.
A number of logics have been devised to represent societies of agents in the both the philosophy
and computer science literature. In particular, there exist variants of Alternating-time Temporal
Logic (ATL) [1, 2, 39, 48, 49] and as ‘Seeing To It That’ (STIT) theories [5, 11, 28, 35, 45]. Albeit
a good starting point, we claim that they miss the mark for a comprehensive ontology of powers, as
their models lack one or more of the concepts that we consider essential to a theory of powers: what
we need is a logic whose language allows to express the intricate relationship between the concepts
that are involved in this ontology: action, agency, knowledge and goals.
3The view of beliefs as reasons for intending has been extensively debated in the philosophical literature (see, e.g. [17]).
(1) Agency: there are at least two candidates for a logic of agency. ATL logics [2, 39] are designed to
express what coalitions can achieve by cooperating. ATL has coalition modalities 〈〈G〉〉 where
G is an arbitrary group of agentsG. The ATL formula 〈〈G〉〉Xϕ means that coalitionG has a col-
lective strategy to ensure that, no matter what the other agents do, ϕ will be true in the next state.
In deliberative STIT theories [5, 28] modal operators of the form [G cstit :], are meant to
capture a notion of choice being made by agents in G. A modal operator ✷ of historic
necessity, whose dual operator of historic possibility is ✸–, should also be part of the language
to talk about what could have happened otherwise. In formulas, [G cstit :ϕ] and ✸[G cstit :ϕ],
respectively, mean that G sees to it that ϕ and G can see to it that ϕ.
(2) Knowledge: in [26], we have already argued for the relevance of the refined language of STIT
theories when it comes to mixing the logic of agency with epistemic notions. In ATL this
leads to difficulties, as acknowledged in [29], and various complexifications of the original
semantics have been put forward [30, 31].
(3) Goals: one of the main differences between an agent and a mere process in a distributed system
is a goal-oriented decision process that guides which action the agent takes. Within a society
of agents, some individuals might have the incentive to collude or simply take benefit of other
agents’ actions to achieve their goals.
(4) Action terms: it is usually considered an advantage of logics of agency that they abstract away
from the actions proper; however, this is also a drawback. Actually modern philosophy of
action led in particular by Davidson [18] generally does not even consider a treatment of action
without explicit reference to the action terms. In our case, we have seen that action terms are
difficult to avoid when talking about influencing power and dependence-based power. For
instance, an agent i’s power of influencing another agent j consists in i’s power to influence
j to do or to refrain from doing a certain action in his action repertoire. As the elements of an
agent’s action repertoire are described by action terms (see [34] for a discussion on this issue),
action terms become necessary in order to define influencing power.
Yet, none of the approaches cited above were intended to support the types of powers in social
interactions that we described. In particular, what is still missing in the logical literature is an
integration of (i) the expressiveness of logics of action and agency with (ii) the expressiveness of a
logic of mental attitudes (so-called BDI logic4) and (iii) dynamic logic [24] where actions of agents
are explicit.5
In this article, we try to fill this gap by developing a logic allowing to reason about mental states
of agents, action occurrences, and agentive and group powers. This will enable us to capture some
important properties of power of and social power.6
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the syntax and the semantics of a
logic of powers and mental states called IAL (Intentional Agency Logic). This logic is based on a
combination of the logic of group actions, powers and capabilities proposed by [25, 33, 36], and a
simple BDI logic. In Section 3, we axiomatize IAL and study some of its properties. In Section 4,
we present some interesting theorems of IAL, and in Section 5 we briefly compare our system
with some existing logics of cooperation and multi-agent interaction. In the last and main part of
4See e.g. [50, 54] for a survey on BDI (belief, desire, intention) logics.
5For a similar attempt to introduce mental attitudes in a logic of strategic interaction, see [37].
6Note that while ATL deals with strategies—or sequences of action—it will not be the case in the present contribution.
This is certainly an important limitation. However, a strategic logic of actual agency is still an open problem, and the
interesting bits of social powers are already expressible with atomic strategies.
this article (Section 6), we exploit IAL to formalize and study the properties of different kinds of
agentive power.
2 A logic of powers and mental states: syntax and semantics
The logic IAL (Intentional Agency Logic) combines the expressiveness of a logic of actions and
mental states with the expressiveness of a logic of social interaction. IAL is based on a combination
of the logic of group actions, powers and capabilities proposed in [25, 33] and a simple BDI logic.
The logic of [25, 33] is a variant of dynamic logic, which embeds STIT logic and Coalition Logic
(CL). It allows to represent group actions both in terms of final outcomes (‘the agents in group C
ensure that ϕ is true by acting together’) and in terms of concrete actions (‘the agents in group C
do the (joint) action δC together’). Symmetrically, it allows to represent group capabilities both in
terms of final outcomes (‘the agents in group C can act together to ensure that ϕ’) and in terms of
concrete actions (‘the agents in group C can do the (joint) action δC together’).
On top of that expressive logic of action and agency, we introduce modal operators for beliefs
and goals of agents. We here consider intentional actions only, i.e. an action is taken by an agent
only if it is the agent’s goal to do so.
We denote by AGT ={1,2,...,n} the finite and non-empty set of agents and we denote by ACT =
{a,b,...} the finite and non-empty set of atomic actions. To every agent i, we associate a set of
ordered pairs Act(i)={i:a |a∈ACT }. We note 2AGT∗ the set of non-empty subsets of AGT . We call
coalitions the elements in 2AGT∗. We note 1 the set of all possible combinations of actions by the
agents in AGT , i.e. 1=
∏
i∈AGT Act(i). Every element δ= (δ1,δ2,...,δn) in 1 is then a vector of
individual actions, one for every agent in AGT , commonly called an action profile. We denote by
δC the coalitional action of the members of coalition C in action profile δ. For convenience, in the
case of singleton coalitions we often write δi instead of δ{i}.
The logic IAL is a propositional modal logic. It extends propositional logic over a set of propo-
sitional variables 5={p,q,...}. The language LIAL is given by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ∨ϕ | ✷ϕ | [i:a]ϕ | DoesCϕ | Beliϕ | Goaliϕ
where p ranges over the set of propositional variables 5, i ranges over the set of agents AGT , a
ranges over the set of actions ACT and C ranges over the set of coalitions 2AGT∗.
Several abbreviations are used in this article. The classical Boolean connectives ∧, →, ↔, ⊤
(tautology) and ⊥ (contradiction) are introduced in the usual way. 〈i:a〉ϕ abbreviates ¬[i:a]¬ϕ and
✸ϕ abbreviates ¬✷¬ϕ. Moreover, 〈δC〉ϕ abbreviates
∧
i∈C〈δi〉ϕ and [δC]ϕ abbreviates ¬〈δC〉¬ϕ.
The formula Beliϕ reads ‘agent i believes that ϕ’. The operator Goali is intended to represent
agent i’s chosen goals and is similar to the operator introduced in [14]. The formula Goaliϕ then
reads ‘agent i has decided to pursue ϕ’ or, for short, ‘agent i wants that ϕ’.
The reading of [i:a]ϕ is ‘ϕ holds after every occurrence of action a performed by agent i’. Hence,
[i:a]⊥ formalizes that the agent i does not do action a. The formula DoesCϕ reads ‘coalition C
brings about that ϕ whatever the agents in AGT \C do’ or simply ‘coalition C brings about that
ϕ’. For notational convenience, we write Doesiϕ instead of Does{i}ϕ for every i∈AGT . Finally, the
operator ✷ is used to quantify over action profiles. Thus, ✷ϕ has to be read ‘ϕ holds whatever the
agents do’, or simply ‘ϕ is necessarily true’.
As we show in Section 3, given the semantical constraints that we impose on our logic, the more
natural reading of 〈i:a〉ϕ is ‘agent i does a and ϕ will be true afterwards’, and the more natural
reading of [i:a]ϕ is ‘if agent i does a then ϕ will be true afterwards’.
We can offer some more intuitions about the language and have a first glimpse of the expressions
of powers. The formula ✸ϕ is read ‘there exists a world corresponding to a choice for every agent
in which ϕ is true’ or simply ‘ϕ can/may be true’. The operators ✸ and DoesC (respectively Doesi)
can be exploited for expressing what a coalition C (respectively a single agent i) is able to bring
about. Hence, the formula ✸DoesCϕ reads ‘there exists a world corresponding to a choice for every
agent in which coalition C brings about that ϕ’ or simply ‘ coalition C can bring about that ϕ’.
2.1 Model definition
Our semantics is in terms of possible world models. Such models are based on the following very
abstract definition of Kripke frames: a set of states and a collection of binary relations over that set.
DEFINITION 2.1 (Kripke frame)
A Kripke frame is a tuple
F= (W ,H ,{Ri:a | i∈AGT ,a∈ACT },{DC |C∈2
AGT∗},{Bi | i∈AGT },{Gi | i∈AGT }).
Each binary relation over W interprets one of the modalities of the language of IAL.
In the logic IAL, there is a one-to-one correspondence between worlds and actions profiles:
every world w∈W corresponds to a unique strategy profile that is played at w. Therefore, H (w)=
{v | (w,v)∈H } gives the set of action profiles which are alternative to the action profile played at
w. However, H can also be viewed as the relation that models historic possibility in the sense
of STIT theory, i.e. H (w) gives the set of historic alternatives to the state w. For every agent i
and action a∈ACT , Ri:a(w)={v | (w,v)∈Ri:a} models the set of the possible consequences of the
execution of action a by agent i in world w. For every coalition C, DC(w)={v | (w,v)∈DC} is the
set of worlds that the coalition C brings about at w. Finally, for every agent i, Bi(w)={v | (w,v)∈Bi}
(respectively Gi(w)={v | (w,v)∈Gi}) is the worlds that i considers plausible (respectively that i
intends) at w.
In order to reflect the intuitions, we have to impose a few constraints on Kripke frames. All the
free variables in the below constraint formulations are assumed to be universally quantified. w, w′,
u and v are some states in W ; i and j are agent identifiers; C and C ′ are coalitions.
We first give the most elementary properties, that do not involve interactions between different
relations.
(C.i) H is an equivalence relation
For every w∈W , H (w) is a cluster of historic alternatives as traditionally modelled in the domain
of STIT theory [5, 28].
(C.ii) DC is serial
A coalition C always brings about something.
(C.iii) Bi is transitive, euclidean and serial
An agent i is assumed to have positive and negative introspection and its beliefs are consistent.
(C.iv) Gi is serial
An agent i always has a goal.
(C.v) if u∈DAGT (w) and v∈DAGT (w) then u=v
The grand coalition AGT brings about exactly one outcome.
The next constraints concern the way the relations interact with each other. Arguably the trickiest
constraints are those involving the actions and will be introduced later. On the other hand, the
following two conditions on the relations between mental attitudes formalize assumptions that are
standard in BDI logics (e.g. [14, 41]).
(C.vi) Bi(w)∩Gi(w) 6=∅
This is a condition of weak realism, according to which the set of i’s belief-accessible worlds and
the set of i’s goal-accessible worlds are never disjoint.
(C.vii) if w′∈Bi(w) then Gi(w′)=Gi(w)
Worlds that are compatible with i’s goals are also compatible with i’s goals from those worlds which
are compatible with i’s beliefs.
(C.viii) if w′∈Bi(w) and v∈H (w) then there is a u such that u∈H (w′)∩Bi(v)
It is a semantic condition of confluence between the relations Bi and H .
The following constraints concern the accessibility relation corresponding to the actions. We
define RδC =
⋂
i∈CRδi in order to make the presentation of some of them run more smoothly.
(C.ix) ⋃a∈ACT Ri:a(w) 6=∅
An agent i always has at least one action to be performed. In other words, agents are never passive.
(C.x) for B∩C=∅, if there is a u∈H (w) such that RδB (u) 6=∅ and there is a v∈H (w) such that
Rδ′C (v) 6=∅ then there is a w
′∈H (w) such that RδB (w
′) 6=∅ and Rδ′C (w
′) 6=∅
Given two disjoint coalitions B and C, if the agents in B can do together an action δB in some historic
alternative and the agents in C can do together an action δ′C in some other historic alternative, then
there is a historic alternative where the agents in B∪C do together the collective action (δB,δ′C). This
constraint corresponds to the independence of agents in STIT and to the superadditivity property in
social choice theory [39].
(C.xi) if u∈Ri:a(w) and v∈Rj:b(w) then u=v
All actions executed in one world lead to the same unique world. This semantic constraint justifies
the reading of 〈i:a〉ϕ and [i:a]ϕ as ‘agent i does a and ϕ will be true after the occurrence of a
performed by i’ and ‘if agent i does a then ϕ will be true after the occurrence of a performed by i’.
(C.xii) if i:a 6= i:b then Ri:a(w)=∅ or Ri:b(w)=∅
An agent cannot execute more than one action at a time.
(C.xiii) if RδC (w) 6=∅ then if v∈H (w) and u∈RδC (v) then u∈DC(w)
If coalition C performs the joint action δC at w and there is a historic alternative v to w where δC is
also executed and leads to state u, then u is among the states brought about by the coalition C at w.
(C.xiv) if RδC (w) 6=∅ and u∈DC(w) then there exists v∈H (w) such that u∈RδC (v)
If the coalitional action δC is executed at w and u is among the states brought about by C at w, then
there is a historic alternative to w where δC is executed leading to u.
(C.xv) if Ri:a(w) 6=∅ then for all u∈Gi(w) we have Ri:a(u) 6=∅
If a is performed by i then a is performed by i at each of i’s goal-accessible worlds. This means that
actions are intentional: i performs a only if a is performed in all worlds that i intends.
(C.xvi) if u∈Ri:a(w) and u′∈Bi(v) then there is a w′∈Bi(w) such that u′∈Ri:a(w′)
What an agent i believes at a world u after performing an action a only depends on what the agent
believed at the previous world w before performing a.
We are now ready to give the definition of the models of IAL.
DEFINITION 2.2 (model of IAL)
A model of IAL is a tuple M= (W ,H ,{Ri:a},{DC},{Bi},{Gi},π) where:
• (W ,H ,{Ri:a},{DC},{Bi},{Gi}) is a Kripke frame satisfying constraints (C.i) to (C.xvi);
• π :5−→2W is a valuation function.
2.2 Truth conditions
Given a model M , a world w and a formula ϕ, we write M ,w |=ϕ to mean that ϕ is true at world
w in M , under the basic semantics. The rules defining the truth conditions of formulas of our logic
are inductively defined as follows.
M ,w |=p iff w∈π (p)
M ,w |=¬ϕ iff not M ,w |=ϕ
M ,w |=ϕ∨ψ iff M ,w |=ϕ or M ,w |=ψ
M ,w |=✷ϕ iff for all w′∈W if w′∈H (w) then M ,w′ |=ϕ
M ,w |=[i:a]ϕ iff for all w′∈W if w′∈Ri:a(w) then M ,w′ |=ϕ
M ,w |=Beliϕ iff for all w′∈W if w′∈Bi(w) then M ,w′ |=ϕ
M ,w |=Goaliϕ iff for all w′∈W if w′∈Gi(w) then M ,w′ |=ϕ
M ,w |=DoesCϕ iff for all w′∈W if w′∈DC(w′) then M ,w′ |=ϕ
We write |=ϕ if formula ϕ is valid in all IAL models, i.e. M ,w |=ϕ for every IAL model M
and world w in M.
3 Axiomatization
Let be an arbitrary modality of necessity and its dual modality of possibility. We are going to use
some standard axioms of modal logic. We are assuming some familiarity with normal modal logic
and refer to [13] for details. Axiom K is (p→q)→ (p→q). Axiom D (p→p) is canonical
for serial frames.7 Axiom T (p→p) is canonical for reflexive frames. Axiom B (p→p) is
canonical for symmetric frames.8 Axiom 4 (→p) is canonical for transitive frames. Axiom 5
(p→p) is canonical for Euclidian frames.
We call IAL the logic axiomatized by the principles given in Figure 1 together with the rule of
Modus Ponens (from ⊢IALϕ→ψ and ⊢IALϕ infer ⊢IALψ) and the rule of necessitation for every
modality (from ⊢IALϕ infer ⊢IAL ϕ). We write ⊢IALϕ if ϕ is derivable in the proof system of
IAL.
We now discuss the axioms and refine our intuitions.
KT5✷ makes ✷ a modality of historic necessity [44]. A historic alternative is among its own
alternatives; an alternative is an alternative to all alternatives. The formula ✷ϕ should then be true
when ϕ is true no matter how the future unfolds. Note that since ✷ obeys T and 5 axioms, it is
an S5 modality. KDDoes ensures that a coalition cannot bring about inconsistent states of affairs.
KD45Bel corresponds to the standard axiomatization of doxastic logic [27]: agents have positive and
negation introspection over their beliefs and cannot have inconsistent beliefs.KDGoal ensures that an
agent cannot have inconsistent goals. According to Axiom AltDoes the grand coalition AGT always
produces deterministic effects. Axiom DBel,Goal is a weak realism axiom that relates an agent’s beliefs
with his goals, whereas PosIntr and NegIntr are principles of positive and negative introspection
for goals [20]. Axiom ConflBel,✷ says that if it is historically possible that i believes that ϕ is true
7We say that a formula of a logic is canonical for a class of frames when it forces the models of the logic to satisfy some
property. This information will be useful in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
8Axiom B will not be explicitly used in the axiomatization.
FIG. 1. Axioms of IAL.
then i believes that it is historically possible that ϕ is true. Axiom Active says that an agent always
performs at least one action. Axiom Single says that if an action a∈ACT is performed by agent
i, no other action in ACT is performed by i. Active and Single together capture that every agent
always executes one and only one action from his repertoire. AltAct forces the fact that if the action
a performed by agent i leads to ϕ then every executed action leads to ϕ, may it be an action of i
or any other agent. (Although, an action b in ACT different from a that is also executed will be
impossible here due to Single.) Axiom Indep says that for disjoint coalitions B and C, if agents
in C can do together a certain combination of actions δC and agents in B can do together a certain
combination of actions δ′B then agents in B∪C can do together a combination of actions (δC,δ
′
B).
This axiom is the ‘actional’ counterpart of the axiom of independence of agents (called AIAk ) in
the deliberative STIT theories [5, Chapter 17]. Axiom DoesDef is a mere local definition of the
modality DoesC: if the agents in the coalition C execute the joint action δC then C brings about that
ϕ if and only if, at every historic alternative, if the agents C execute δC then ϕ will be true thereafter.
According to Axiom IntAct, an agent does action a only if he intends to do a. Thus, in our formal
model the actions performed by an agent are intentional actions (see [34] for a discussion of this
assumption). According to Axiom NF (no forgetting Axiom), if an agent believes that ϕ will be true
after he performs a then, after he performs action a, he will believe that ϕ. Similar principles for
the interaction between belief and action or between knowledge and action (sometimes also called
perfect recall) have been studied in [21, 47].
We can prove that IAL is sound and complete with respect to the class of IAL models.
THEOREM 3.1
IAL is determined by the class of models of IAL.
PROOF. It is a routine to prove soundness. It is also routine to check that all axioms of the logic
IAL are in the Sahlqvist class [6]. This means that the axioms are all expressible as first-order
conditions on models and are complete with respect to the defined classes of models. (This can
be established e.g. by applying the SQEMA algorithm [15] and performing some predicate logic
formula rewriting.)
In the following table, we sum up the correspondence between the frame constraints and the
axioms.
Semantic Syntactic Semantic Syntactic
(C.i) KT5✷ (C.ii) KDDoes
(C.iii) KD45Bel (C.iv) KDGoal
(C.v) AltDoes (C.vi) DBel,Goal
(C.vii) PosIntr and NegIntr (C.viii) ConflBel,✷
(C.ix) Active (C.x) Indep
(C.xi) AltAct (C.xii) Single
(C.xiii) and (C.xiv) DoesDef (C.xv) IntAct
(C.xvi) NF
4 Some properties of IAL
Observe that due to determinism of DoesAGT (constraint (C.v)), we may conceive the unique state
w′ such that {w′}=DAGT(w) as the temporal successor of w. Therefore, we can read the formula
DoesAGTϕ as ‘ϕ will be true in the next state’. Thus, DoesAGT can be interpreted as a standard
operator X (next) of temporal logic.
DEFINITION 4.1
The X operator is defined as follows:
Xϕ
def
= DoesAGTϕ
The next proposition highlights some interesting properties of actions and goals in IAL.
PROPOSITION 4.2
For every i∈AGT , a∈ACT , δ∈1 and B,C∈2AGT∗:
⊢IAL (〈δC〉⊤∧DoesCϕ)→✷(〈δC〉⊤→DoesCϕ) (4.1a)
⊢IALDoesBϕ→DoesB∪Cϕ (4.1b)
⊢IALGoali〈i:a〉⊤∨Goali[i:a]⊥ (4.1c)
PROOF. We prove IAL-theorem 4.1b as an example.
DoesBϕ is equivalent to
∨
δB
(〈δB〉⊤∧✷(〈δB〉⊤→[δB]ϕ)) (byAxiomDoesDef andAxiomActive).
The latter implies
∨
δB,δC
(〈δB〉⊤∧〈δC〉⊤∧✷(〈δB〉⊤→[δB]ϕ)) (by Axiom Active), which in turn
implies
∨
δB∪C
(〈δB∪C〉⊤∧✷(〈δB∪C〉⊤→[δB∪C]ϕ)). The latter is equivalent to DoesB∪Cϕ.
According to the IAL-theorem 4.1a in Proposition 4.2, if coalition C brings about that ϕ by doing
the joint action δC then, necessarily, if coalition C does the joint action δC then it will bring about
that ϕ. IAL-theorem 4.1b expresses monotonicity for coalitions: if coalition B brings about that ϕ
then coalition B∪C brings about that ϕ. According to the IAL-theorem 4.1c, at each moment an
agent either decides (intends) to do an action or decides (intends) not to do it.
The following proposition highlights some other noteworthy properties of IAL.
PROPOSITION 4.3
For every i∈AGT , a∈ACT , δ∈1 and B,C∈2AGT∗ such that B∩C=∅:
⊢IAL (✸DoesBϕ∧✸DoesCψ)→✸DoesB∪C(ϕ∧ψ) (4.2a)
⊢IAL (✸DoesBϕ∧✸DoesC¬ϕ)→⊥ (4.2b)
⊢IAL 〈δC〉⊤→ ([δC]ϕ↔Xϕ) (4.2c)
⊢IALXϕ↔¬X¬ϕ (4.2d)
⊢IAL✷Xϕ→✷DoesCϕ (4.2e)
⊢IAL 〈i:a〉⊤↔Goali〈i:a〉⊤ (4.2f )
⊢IAL 〈i:a〉⊤↔Beli〈i:a〉⊤ (4.2g)
⊢IAL [i:a]⊥↔Goali[i:a]⊥ (4.2h)
⊢IAL [i:a]⊥↔Beli[i:a]⊥ (4.2i)
⊢IALBeli✷ϕ→✷Beliϕ (4.2j)
⊢IALBeliXϕ→XBeliϕ (4.2k)
⊢IALBeli✷Xϕ→✷XBeliϕ (4.2l)
⊢IALBeliX✷ϕ→X✷Beliϕ (4.2m)
⊢IAL (Goaliϕ∧Beli(ϕ→〈i:a〉⊤))→Goali〈i:a〉⊤ (4.2n)
PROOF. We prove the IAL-theorems 4.2a, 4.2e and 4.2j as an example.
We first prove 4.2a. Suppose B∩C=∅. ✸DoesBϕ∧✸DoesCψ is equivalent to
∨
δB,δC
(✸(〈δB〉⊤∧
✷(〈δB〉⊤→[δB]ϕ))∧✸(〈δC〉⊤∧✷(〈δC〉⊤→[δC]ψ))) (by Axiom DoesDef and Axiom Active). As
B∩C=∅, the latter implies
∨
δB∪C
✸(〈δB∪C〉⊤∧✷(〈δB〉⊤→[δB]ϕ)∧✷(〈δC〉⊤→[δC]ψ)) (by Axiom
Indep) which in turn implies
∨
δB∪C
✸(〈δB∪C〉⊤∧✷(〈δB∪C〉⊤→ ([δB]ϕ∧[δC]ψ))). By the valid equiv-
alence ([δB]ϕ∧[δC]ψ)↔[δB∪C](ϕ∧ψ) the latter is equivalent to
∨
δB∪C
✸(〈δB∪C〉⊤∧✷(〈δB∪C〉⊤→
[δB∪C](ϕ∧ψ))), which in turn is equivalent to ✸DoesB∪C(ϕ∧ψ) (by Axiom DoesDef and Axiom
Active).
We now prove 4.2e. ✷Xϕ is equivalent to ✷
∨
δ(〈δ〉⊤∧✷(〈δ〉⊤→[δ]ϕ)) (by Axiom DoesDef
and Axiom Active). The latter implies ✷
∨
δ(〈δ〉⊤∧[δ]ϕ) (by Axiom T for ✷) which in turn implies
✷
∨
δC
(〈δC〉⊤∧[δC]ϕ). The latter implies ✷
∨
δC
〈δC〉ϕ which in turn implies ✷
∧
δC
[δC]ϕ (by Axiom
AltAct). From the latter it follows that
∧
δC
✷[δC]ϕ which in turn implies
∧
δC
✷(〈δC〉⊤→[δC]ϕ).
From the latter, by Axiom 4 for ✷, it follows that ✷
∧
δC
✷(〈δC〉⊤→[δC]ϕ) which in turn implies
✷
∨
δC
(〈δC〉⊤∧✷(〈δC〉⊤→[δC]ϕ)) (by Axiom Active). The latter is equivalent to ✷DoesCϕ (by
Axiom DoesDef ).
We now prove 4.2j. Beli✷ϕ implies ✷✸Beli✷ϕ (by Axiom K, Axiom T and necessitation rule
for ✷) which in turn implies ✷Beli✸✷ϕ (by Axiom K and necessitation rule for ✷ and Axiom
ConflBel,✷). The latter implies ✷Beli✷ϕ (by the equivalence ✸✷ϕ↔✷ϕ which is derivable by
Axiom T and Axiom 5 for✷) which in turn implies✷Beliϕ (by AxiomK, Axiom T and necessitation
rule for ✷, Axiom K and necessitation rule for Beli).
IAL-theorem 4.2a in Proposition 4.3 says that two disjoint coalitions can combine their efforts to
ensure a conjunction of outcomes. This corresponds to the superadditivity axiom of Coalition Logic
[39] of the form [B]ϕ∧[C]ψ→[B∪C](ϕ∧ψ) (when B∩C=∅). IAL-theorem 4.2b, which is a
direct consequence of IAL-theorem 4.2a, says that two disjoint coalitions can never bring about
conflicting effects. According to the IAL-theorem 4.2c, if the agents in coalition C execute the
joint action δC then, ϕ will be true in the next state if and only if ϕ will be true after the execution
of δC . IAL-theorem 4.2d shows the tight correspondence between our definition of next and the
standard operator next of linear temporal logic (LTL). According to the IAL-theorem 4.2e, if ϕ
will be necessarily true in the next state then, necessarily, coalition C will ensure ϕ in the next state.
IAL-theorems 4.2f-4.2i are about the relations between intention, belief and action occurrences:
an agent i executes (respectively does not execute) an action a if and and only if i has the intention
to do (respectively not to do) a, an agent i executes (respectively does not execute) an action a if
and and only if i believes that he does (respectively does not do) a. IAL-theorems 4.2j-4.2m are
about the relations between belief, historic necessity and the temporal modality next.
IAL-theorem 4.2n expresses a sort of generative principle for intentions according to which, if i
wants ϕ to be true and believes that ϕ will be true only if he does a then i comes to intend to do a.
The belief Beli(ϕ→〈i:a〉⊤) should be called agent i’s reason for intending to do action a [3, 17, 53]
(see also Section 6.2.1).
It has to be noted that neither Doesiϕ→BeliDoesiϕ nor ¬Doesiϕ→Beli¬Doesiϕ are IAL valid.
This highlights that an agent is not necessarily aware of what he will bring about.
5 Comparison with STIT and Coalition Logic
5.1 Main differences between STIT and IAL
There are some substantial differences between IAL and STIT theories. Formulas in STIT logic are
built by means of the Boolean connectives together with the modal operator ✷ of historic necessity
and the so-called Chellas STIT operator [i cstit : ]. The modal construction ✷ϕ is read ‘ϕ is true in
all possible histories’, whereas [i cstit :ϕ] is read ‘agent i sees to it that ϕ’. Thus, ✸[i cstit :ϕ] and
✷[i cstit :ϕ] can be read ‘agent i can see to it that ϕ’ and ‘agent i necessarily sees to it that ϕ’.
STIT formulas such as [i cstit :ϕ] being interpreted by means of reflexive relations,
[i cstit :ϕ]→ϕ is valid in STIT. This implies that in STIT theory, actions are supposed to rep-
resent ex post acto action sentences, or finished actions. In IAL, the construct DoesCϕ indicates
that a coalition of agents is about to take an action that brings about ϕ, and that action has its results
at the next moment. For these reasons, for every C⊆AGT the relation DC is simply a serial relation
and for every C⊆AGT the formula DoesCϕ∧¬ϕ is satisfiable.9
5.2 Relationship between Coalition Logic and IAL
Pauly’s Coalition Logic (CL) [39] is a popular logic for multi-agent systems that stems from social
choice theory. CL has been introduced to reason about what single agents and groups of agents are
able to achieve. CL has coalition modalities of the form [C] where C is an arbitrary coalition of
agents C⊆AGT (where AGT is the set of all agents). The CL formula [C]ϕ is read ‘the coalition C
can bring about (can enforce an outcome state satisfying) ϕ’. Space restrictions prevent presenting
in the detail the mathematical relationship between CL and IAL. However, we have explored them
in [33], in which it is proved that a slightly different variant of IAL without modal operators for
beliefs and goals embeds CL. In particular, the CL formula [C]ϕ can be translated into IAL by the
formula ✸DoesCϕ.
One can observe that logics for agency and multi-agent systems have three dimensions: historic
necessity/possibility, agent’s choice and time. In CL and ATL, these three components are fused
and make up a single non-normal modal operator. We have seen that in STIT logic, these three
9Note that in STIT theory ✷ϕ→ [i cstit :ϕ] is also valid. This is not the case in IAL where for every C⊆AGT ✷ϕ∧
¬DoesCϕ is satisfiable.
ingredients are separated, and each has its own modal operator. In IAL, we explore the middle
ground: we fuse the choice and the temporal next operator. A similar construction is used in [8].
6 Varieties of power
This last part of the article provides a comprehensive formal ontology of power in the logic IAL.
We start with an analysis of the general concept of power of (Section 6.1). Then, in Section 6.2, we
study social power by distinguishing the three general concepts of influencing power, persuasive
power and dependence-based social power.
6.1 Power of
The aim of this section is to provide a formal characterization of the concept of power of by
exploiting the expressiveness of IAL. As argued in [4, 12], for an agent i to have the power of
achieving ϕ, i must have the objective capability to achieve ϕ and must be aware of this.10 In fact,
without i’s discretion over his objective capability i would be unable to exploit it in order to ensure
ϕ. A first rough pre-formal definition of i’s power of achieving ϕ is given by the following two
conditions:
(1) i can bring about that ϕ (objective capability); and
(2) i believes that he can bring about that ϕ (discretion over the capability).
In IAL, the former condition is expressed by the formula ✸Doesiϕ, while the latter condition is
expressed by Beli✸Doesiϕ.
Let us we denote by Kiϕ agent i’s correct belief that ϕ holds.
DEFINITION 6.1
For every i∈AGT :
Kiϕ
def
= Beliϕ∧ϕ
The modal operator Ki is normal, and obeys the principles of the logic S4. That is, if an agent i has
a correct belief that ϕ then ϕ is true (⊢IALKiϕ→ϕ), and an agent i has positive introspection over
his correct beliefs (⊢IALKiϕ→KiKiϕ). Moreover, Ki satisfies Axiom K and necessitation. Thus,
one might try to formalize the concept i’s power of achieving ϕ by the formulaKi✸Doesiϕ. But this
is not sufficient to formalize a genuine concept of power. In fact, the formula Ki✸Doesiϕ simply
says ‘i correctly believes that there exists some action whose execution can ensure ϕ’. It does not
say ‘there is some action such that if agent i chooses it, i correctly believes that he will ensure ϕ by
doing that action’.11 To see whyKi✸Doesiϕ is insufficient to capture the concept of power, consider
the scenario in Figure 2. Agent i is at world w1 and is in front of two doors A and B. Behind door A
‘there is a treasure’ (proposition t), behind door B there is nothing. Besides, i believes that behind
one of the two doors there is a treasure, whereas behind the other there is nothing, but he is not sure
whether the treasure is behind door A or B. The agent can either open door A (action a) or open door
B (action b). In the world w1 and in each world which is compatible with i’s beliefs at w1 (worlds w3
A similar argument is given in [52] where the notion of practical possibility is distinguished from the notion of power.
11The necessity to distinguish de dicto sentences of the form ‘i knows that there exists some action by doing which he
can ensure ϕ’ from de re sentences of the form ‘there is some action such that if agent i chooses it, i correctly believes that
he will ensure ϕ by doing that action’ has also been stressed in [11, 31, 46].
FIG. 2. Example of IAL-model. The equivalence relation H is depicted by the dashed lines and
form clusters of historic alternatives.
and w5), it is the case that he can get the treasure. From this, we conclude that at w1 agent i correctly
believes that he can get the treasure: Ki✸Doesit holds at w1. Unfortunately, there is no action such
that if agent i chooses it, he correctly believes that he will get the treasure. So, it is reasonable to say
that in the example, i does not have the power of getting the treasure. At world w1 agent i cannot
correctly believe that he will get the treasure by opening door A, nor can he correctly believe that
he will get the treasure by opening door B: ¬✸Ki(〈i:a〉⊤∧Doesit) and ¬✸Ki(〈i:b〉⊤∧Doesit) hold
at w1. More generally, at w1 there is no action such that if agent i chooses it, he correctly believes
that he will get the treasure: ¬✸KiDoesit holds at w1.
From the previous example, we have to conclude that an agent i does not have the power of
achieving ϕ unless:
(*) there is some action such that if agent i chooses it, he correctly believes that he will ensure the
property ϕ.
Statement (*) corresponds to a notion of power of that can be formalized in IAL.
DEFINITION 6.2
For every i∈AGT :
PowerOf(i,ϕ) def= ✸KiDoesiϕ
By Axiom ConflBel,✷, we can show that PowerOf(i,ϕ) implies Ki✸Doesiϕ (but not vice versa)
which, as discussed above, characterizes a situation of uncertainty in which i cannot determine
what action must be taken to ensure ϕ. The following IAL-theorem highlights another noteworthy
property of the previous notion of power of. For every i∈AGT :
⊢IAL PowerOf(i,ϕ)↔KiPowerOf(i,ϕ) (6.1)
PROOF. We only prove left-to-right direction of IAL-theorem 6.1. The other direction is trivially sat-
isfied by definition ofKiϕ. By definition ofPowerOf(i,δi,ϕ) andKiϕ, we have thatPowerOf(i,δi,ϕ)
implies ✸KiDoesiϕ. Moreover, ✸Kiϕ→Ki✸ϕ and Kiϕ→KiKiϕ are theorems of IAL (by defini-
tion ofKiϕ, Axiom 4 for Beli and Axiom ConflBel,✷). Therefore,✸KiDoesiϕ implies✸KiKiDoesiϕ
which in turn implies Ki✸KiDoesiϕ. From this and the definition of PowerOf(i,ϕ), we can infer
KiPowerOf(i,ϕ).
According to the IAL-theorem 6.1, an agent has the power of achieving ϕ if and only if he correctly
believes this.
6.2 Social power
An interesting form of power on which many authors in sociology have focused is the intrinsically
social power called power over. However, there is no consensus on the meaning of the expression
‘an agent has power over another agent with respect a given issue, fact, etc’. Several kinds of social
power have been investigated and defined.
While power, in its most general sense, can be seen as an agent’s capability of producing causal
effects and the agent’s awareness of this capability (Section 6.1), social power is an agent’s causal
power to affect the conduct of other agents. Therefore, the most important aspect of social power is
that it is a bipartite relation between two agents, one of whom is the principal agent, and the other
the subordinate agent.
A point of disagreement is whether i’s power over j should be based on i’s ability to affect the
behaviour of j by inducing j to intend to do a certain action or to refrain from doing a certain action
(power of influencing) or whether it should be based on j’s dependence on i for the achievement of
his goals (dependence-based social power). The former concept of power is studied for instance in
[16], whereas the latter is investigated in [12, 23]. The authors in [12, 23] emphasize that the two
notions of power are closely interdependent. In fact, if i has a dependence-based power over j and
he knows this, then he is in a position to make threats or offers to j in order to affect his behaviour
thereby having a power of influencing j.
The aim of this section is to formalize in our logic IAL the most important kinds of social power
and to provide an analysis of their logical relationships.
6.2.1 Influencing power and persuasive power
The first kind of social power we consider is influencing power. We say that agent i has the power
of influencing agent j when i is in a position to induce j to intend to do certain action or in a position
to induce j to refrain from doing a certain action. In the former case, i has the power of shaping j’s
preferences in such a way that j will intend to do a certain action, in the latter case i has the power of
shaping j’s preferences in such a way that j will intend not to do a certain action. More succinctly,
we say that i has the power of influencing j to do (respectively not to do) action a, denoted by
InflPower(i,j,a) (respectively InflPower(i,j,∼a)), if and only if i has the power of ensuring that j
will intend to do (respectively will intend not to do) action a. Formally:
DEFINITION 6.3
For every i,j∈AGT , a∈ACT :
InflPower(i,j,a) def= PowerOf(i,Goalj〈j:a〉⊤)
DEFINITION 6.4
For every i,j∈AGT , a∈ACT :
InflPower(i,j,∼a) def= PowerOf(i,Goalj[j:a]⊥)
We here distinguish influencing power from persuasive power (see [42] for an account of this
concept in sociological theory). We say that i has the power of persuading j to believe ϕ, noted
PersPower(i,j,ϕ), if and only if i has the power of ensuring that j will believe ϕ.
DEFINITION 6.5
For every i,j∈AGT :
PersPower(i,j,ϕ) def= PowerOf(i,Beljϕ)
As emphasized in Section 1 and 4, certain beliefs can provide reasons for intending to perform
a certain action. For instance, suppose an agent has a certain goal ϕ and believes that he will
not achieve ϕ unless he performs action a. Then, since the agent follows the general principle of
instrumental reasoning expressed by the IAL-theorem 4.2n in Proposition 4.3 (Section 4), he will
intend to perform action a in order to achieve his goal that ϕ.12 The belief in the premises of this
piece of practical reasoning provides a reason for intending to do action a. Thus, as the following
IAL-theorem highlights, if agent i correctly believes that necessarily agent j will have the goal ϕ
and agent i has the persuasive power of giving to j the reason for intending to do action a in order to
achieve ϕ then, indirectly, i has the power of influencing j to do a. In particular, if i has the power
of persuading j that he will not achieve ϕ unless he does a and i correctly believes that, necessarily,
in the next state j will have the goal that ϕ then, i has the power of influencing j to do action a. For
every i,j∈AGT , a∈ACT :
⊢IAL (Ki✷XGoaljϕ∧PersPower(i,j,ϕ→〈j:a〉⊤))→ InflPower(i,j,a) (6.2)
PROOF. PersPower(i,j,ϕ→〈j:a〉⊤) is equivalent to ✸KiDoesiBelj(ϕ→〈j:a〉⊤).
Ki✷XGoaljϕ implies Ki✷✷XGoaljϕ (by Axiom 4 for ✷, Axiom K and necessitation for Ki)
which in turn implies ✷Ki✷XGoaljϕ (by IAL-theorem 4.2j). Thus, PersPower(i,j,ϕ→〈j:a〉⊤)
and Ki✷XGoaljϕ together imply ✸KiDoesiBelj(ϕ→〈j:a〉⊤)∧✷Ki✷XGoaljϕ. The latter implies
✸Ki(DoesiBelj(ϕ→〈j:a〉⊤)∧✷XGoaljϕ) (by the IAL-theorem (✷ϕ∧✸ψ)→✸(ϕ∧ψ)) which
in turn implies ✸Ki(DoesiBelj(ϕ→〈j:a〉⊤)∧DoesiGoaljϕ) (by IAL-theorem 4.2e, Axiom T for
✷, Axiom K and necessitation for Ki, Axiom K and necessitation for ✷). The latter implies
✸KiDoesi(Belj(ϕ→〈j:a〉⊤)∧Goaljϕ) which in turn implies ✸KiDoesiGoalj〈j:a〉⊤ (by IAL-
theorem 4.2n, Axiom K and necessitation for Ki, Axiom K and necessitation for ✷, Axiom K
and necessitation for Doesi). The latter is equivalent to InflPower(i,j,a).
As in [40], we also distinguish influencing power from indirect power. In our view, agent i has the
indirect power of achieving ϕ by means of agent j, noted IndPower(i,j,ϕ), if and only if i has the
power of ensuring that j will bring about that ϕ.
DEFINITION 6.6
For every i,j∈AGT , a∈ACT :
IndPower(i,j,ϕ) def= PowerOf(i,Doesjϕ)
12Instrumental reasoning (generally opposed to theoretical reasoning), is the kind of reasoning that concludes in an action
or in an intention [3].
6.2.2 Dependence-based social power
Social dependence have been extensively studied in the multi-agent system (MAS) domain as a fun-
damental concept for understanding social relations and their dynamics (see, e.g. [43]). As empha-
sized in [12], social power is often based on social dependence: agent i has a power over agent j
because j can achieve his goals only by the aid of i (in this sense j depends on i). Our aim here is
to formalize the concept of social dependence and to study its logical relationships with influencing
power and persuasive power defined above.
We say that an agent j depends on agent i with respect to the achievement of ϕ (or i has a
dependence-based power over j with respect to ϕ), noted Dep(j,i,ϕ), if and only if agent j wants ϕ
to be true and, necessarily, the coalition AGT \{i} cannot bring about that ϕ no matter what agent
i does. In other words, j depends on i with respect to ϕ if and only if j wants ϕ to be true and the
intervention of i is necessary to ensure that ϕ will be true.
DEFINITION 6.7
For every i,j∈AGT :
Dep(j,i,ϕ) def= GoaljXϕ∧✷¬DoesAGT\{i}ϕ
REMARK 6.8
Note that the clause✷¬DoesAGT\{i}ϕ in the definition of social dependence corresponds to the game-
theoretic concept of β-ability or ∀∃-capability (see, e.g. [38, 51]). Intuitively, a coalition C is said
to have β-ability for ϕ if and only if, for every joint action (or collective choice) δAGT\C of the
agents in AGT \C, there exists a possible joint action (or collective choice) δ′C of the agents in C
such that, necessarily if C does δ′C and AGT \C does δAGT\C , then ϕ will be true. Thus, the formula
✷¬DoesAGT\{i}ϕ just expresses that agent i has the β-ability for ¬ϕ.
A 4-arguments definition of dependence can also be given in which the action of agent i on which
agent j depends is specified. We say that an agent j depends on the execution of action a by agent i
with respect to the achievement of ϕ, noted Dep(j,i,a,ϕ), if and only if agent j wants ϕ to be true
and, necessarily, ϕ will be true in the next state only if i performs action a. In other words, j depends
on the execution of action a by agent i with respect to ϕ if and only if j wants ϕ to be true and the
occurrence of action a performed by i is necessary to ensure ϕ.
DEFINITION 6.9
For every i,j∈AGT , a∈ACT : Dep(j,i,a,ϕ) def= GoaljXϕ∧✷(Xϕ→〈i:a〉⊤)
As the following IAL-theorem highlights, the 4-argument definition of social dependence is stronger
than the 3-argument definition: if agent j depends on agent i’s action a for the achievement of ϕ
then j depends on i for the achievement of ϕ. For every i,j∈AGT , a∈ACT :
⊢IAL Dep(j,i,a,ϕ)→Dep(j,i,ϕ) (6.3)
Social dependence on an agent’s action has a symmetric concept of social dependence on an agent’s
inaction. We say that an agent j depends on agent i’s inexecution of action a with respect to ϕ, noted
Dep(j,i,∼a,ϕ), if and only if agent j wants ϕ to be true and, necessarily, ϕ will be true in the next
state only if i does not perform action a.
DEFINITION 6.10
For every i,j∈AGT , a∈ACT :
Dep(j,i,∼a,ϕ) def= GoaljXϕ∧✷(Xϕ→[i:a]⊥)
As for social dependence on action, the 4-argument definition of social dependence on inaction
is stronger than the 3-argument definition of social dependence: if agent j depends on agent i’s
inexecution of action a for the achievement of ϕ then j depends on i for the achievement of ϕ. For
every i,j∈AGT , a∈ACT :
⊢IAL Dep(j,i,∼a,ϕ)→Dep(j,i,ϕ) (6.4)
We conclude with two IAL-theorems about the logical relationship between dependence-based
social power, influencing power and persuasive power. For every i,j∈AGT and a,b∈ACT :
⊢IAL (PersPower(i,j,[j:b]⊥→X[i:a]⊥)∧KiBelj✷XX Dep(j,i,a,ϕ))→
InflPower(i,j,b)
(6.5)
⊢IAL (PersPower(i,j,〈j:b〉⊤→X〈i:a〉⊤)∧KiBelj✷XX Dep(j,i,∼a,ϕ))→
InflPower(i,j,∼b)
(6.6)
According to the IAL-theorem 6.5, if i has the power of persuading j that if j does not do b then
i will not do a and, i correctly believes that j believes that necessarily in two steps from now he
will depend on i’s action a for the achievement of ϕ then, i has the power of influencing j to do
b. IAL-theorem 6.6 is the corresponding version for dependence on an agent’s inaction. Consider
the example we gave in Section 1 of this article in which i and j are two countries in a conflict
situation. Suppose i has the power of persuading j that if j makes an embargo against i then i
will move a military attack against j: PersPower(i,j,〈j:embargo〉⊤→X〈i:attack〉⊤). Moreover, i
correctly believes that j believes that, necessarily, the achievement of his goal of avoiding a war
against i depends on the fact that i will not attack: KiBelj✷XXDep(j,i,∼attack,¬war). By the
IAL-theorem 6.6, we conclude that i has the power of influencing j not to make an embargo against
him: InflPower(i,j,∼embargo).
7 Conclusion
In this article, we have developed a logical framework that allows to formalize different forms of
power and to clarify their relationships with the concept of action and with intentional concepts
like the concepts of belief and goal. There are important forms of power that we did not consider
here and that are crucial for a theory of organization. For instance, we did not consider the concept
of institutional power that an agent has qua player of a certain role within the context of an
organization and which is specified by means of rules of the form ‘an act a performed by an agent
i playing a certain role r counts as i’s act of ensuring ϕ’ (e.g. a priest’s act of performing certain
gestures during a wedding ceremony counts as the priest’s act of marrying a couple). See, e.g.
[32] for a logical account of institutional power. In other words, in this work we have been mainly
interested in the logical analysis of the cognitive constituents of power, without relating this concept
to the theory of organization. Thus, our logical approach is somehow complementary to the logical
approach proposed by Dignum & Dignum [19] in which the cognitive aspect of agency and of
social interaction is not considered, but which is interested in clarifying the relationships between
the concept of action and the organizational concepts of role (e.g. role dependency, role hierarchy),
responsibility and delegation.
There are several ways in which the work presented in this article can be extended. An interesting
direction of application of the logic IAL is the theory of collective powers [12]. IAL’s constructions
for groups of agents of the form DoesCϕ can be useful for understanding how powers of coalitions
interact with powers and mental attitudes of individuals. We have argued that, for an agent i to have
the power of achieving ϕ, i must have both the objective capability to ensure ϕ and must be aware
of his capability. The same argument applies to collective powers. Indeed, it seems reasonable to
suppose that, for a group of agents C to have the power of achieving ϕ, the agents in C must be
able to perform a joint action that will ensure ϕ and must be collectively aware of this, where being
collectively aware of something seems to require some group attitude notions such as common
belief.
We also think that IAL extended with modal operators for common belief of the formCBelC (see,
e.g. [21] for an analysis of these modalities) is a suitable framework for formalizing the concept of
joint intention as defined in [7]. In Bratman’s analysis, there are three basic conditions in the definition
of joint intention. We can approximately say that a group of agents C has the joint intention that ϕ if
and only if every agent in C intends that the group C ensures ϕ (joint goal condition),13 every agent
in C intends that the group C performs the joint action δC in order to ensure ϕ (joint plan condition),
and these two facts are common belief between the agents in C (common ground condition). Thus,
Bratman’s concept of joint intention can be translated into IAL extended with common belief by
the following formula:
∧
i∈CGoali(〈δC〉⊤∧DoesCϕ)∧CBelC(
∧
i∈CGoali(〈δC〉⊤∧DoesCϕ)).
Another interesting avenue for future research is to enrich the ontology of action and time of IAL.
Indeed, at the current stage IAL only allows to reason about next states and single-step actions, and
is therefore too weak to account for strategies in the sense of ATL [2] and strategic STIT [9, 10, 28].
A way to overcome this limitation is to enrich the dynamic logic fragment of our two logics by
introducing additional PDL constructs such as action composition (;), choice (∪) and iteration (∗).
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